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Think of this as the Hub-spoke model, with the dispatcher being the hub, and user and edge-node being two spokes. The user and the edge-node only have a 'virtual' connection which contains the 'application' layer packets, and the dispatcher is switching the packets for user and edge-node based on the hash value of a 'token'. This is analogous to the hub-spoke model in SD-WAN, where the hub installs the routes advertised from each spoke node, and based on the packet destination and VPN-index of the connection to do a lookup to forward packets to the right destination spoke. Here the dispatcher uses the 'token' similar to lookup for a VPN-ID to find the VPN-table. Since we only allow one user to interact with one edge-node (only two spokes within the same VPN), the hub only needs to find the 'other' spoke for the packet switching. In multiple instance case, the inst-ID is added to the hash of the token, thus it is still unique one to one mapping. This may change later for more complex topologies and use cases.

Since the The JWT token has the nonce string, and it specifies the authentication or encryption choices. If authentication mechanism is used, all the messages between the laptop and EVE device through edge-view session will be authenticated through the Hash value calculated for the message and the nonce using HMAC Sha256 algorithm. If the encryption mechanism is used, all the messages will be encryption encrypted by sha256 cryptographic algorithm using the nonce with the original message. Even if the 'dispatcher' is compromised in on the path, it can not modify or decode the message since it does not know the nonce in the JWT token.

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